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Concerns at the Margins of Supervised Access to Children
Elizabeth Barker Brandt*
I. INTRODUCTION

Supervised access 1 has emerged as an important tool for managing childcustody matters. In the past fifteen years, formal supervised access programs
have become increasingly common throughout the country. 2 Supervised access
encompasses a number of different situations ranging from the supervision of

custody exchanges between parents,3 to the supervision of all of a parent's
contact with her or his child.4 Supervision may be provided by trained
supervisors, by volunteers, 5 by professionals who also provide therapeutic
7
services in the context of supervision,6 or by family members. Supervision

James E. Rogers Distinguished Professor, University of Idaho College of Law.
I will use the term "supervised access" rather than the term "supervised
visitation." The terms are synonyms and are used interchangeably in the literature. I
believe that "access" better captures the nature of the parent/child contact than does
"visitation."
2 See Janet R. Johnston & Robert B. Straus, Traumatized Children in Supervised
*

Visitation: What Do They Need?, 37 FAM & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 135, 158 n.2
(1999) (reporting that the number of supervised access providers had gone from 70 in
1992 to over 400 in 1998); Nancy Theonnes & Jessica Pearson, Supervised Visitation:
A Profile of Providers, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 460, 463-64 (1999)
(describing the recent growth in 1999 of supervised access services for divorcing
families).
3 For information on "supervised exchanges" generally, see SUPERVISED
VISITATION NETWORK, QUESTIONS PARENTS ASK, http://www.svnetwork.net/InformationForParents.html (2006). These exchanges, "sometimes referred to as 'Monitored
Exchanges' or 'Supervised/Monitored Transfers,"' involve transferring the child from
the control of one parent to the other. Id. In these situations, supervision is limited to
time when the exchange or transfer occurs; the visit itself remains unsupervised. Id.
Supervision enables the parties to take precautions to avoid contact with one another
while the exchange or transfer takes place. Id.
4 Id. ("Supervised Visitation [Access] refers to contact between a non-custodial
parent and one or more children in the presence of a third person responsible for
observing and seeking to ensure the safety of those involved. 'Monitored Visitation,'
'Supervised Child Access,' and 'Supervised Child Contact' are other terms with the
same meaning.")
' See Theonnes & Pearson, supra note 2, at 464 (reporting on a national survey of
supervised access providers and indicating that half the surveyed programs used
student volunteers and another third used community volunteers).
6 See Robert B. Straus, Supervised Visitation and Family Violence, 29 FAM. L. Q.
229, 235 n. 22 (1995) (noting that "[a] trained clinician may provide therapeutic
supervision, but this is actually a form of parent-child psychotherapy with the unique
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may take place in locations specially dedicated for supervision, in the offices
of professional supervisors, in neutral public locations, or even in private
homes. 8
While parents may voluntarily utilize supervised access services,
supervision is most often ordered by courts. 9 The circumstances leading to
court-ordered supervised access to children are varied. Supervised exchanges
may be ordered for safety reasons because one or both parents pose a danger to
each other or to the child or have a history of acting inappropriately when in
the presence of each other or the child.' 0 Temporary supervision of a parent's
contact with a child may be ordered where the parent and child have previously
not had a relationship or where there has been a long interruption in the parentchild relationship; in such situations, supervision is ordered to facilitate the reestablishment of the parent-child relationship. A parent's contact with his or
her child also may be supervised temporarily when allegations are pending that
he or she subjected the child to dangerous, abusive, threatening or

characteristic that the sessions may be the only contact between the parent and
child(ren) involved.").
7 See, e.g., S.F. v. S.F., 2001 WL 1857124 (Del. Fain. Ct. 2001) (mother's
visitation supervised by maternal grandmother); Willis v. Willis, 775 N.E. 2d 878

(Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (father's parents originally designated to supervised visitation
between father and children); Riedman v. Petrella, 828 A.2d 538 (R.I. 2003)
(supervision of mother's access to child provided by mother's sister and brother);
Engel v. Young, 2003 WL 1129451 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (visitation with father
supervised by his former wife or eldest daughter).
8See Nat Stem & Karen Oehme, Defending Neutrality in Supervised Visitation to
Preserve a Crucial Family Court Service, 35 Sw. U. L. REV. 37, 39-40 (2005)
("Supervised visitation programs are located in a variety of places, including schools,

churches, universities, child care agencies, YMCAs, renovated houses, and
courthouses.").
9 See, e.g., SUPERVISED VISITATION NETWORK, supra note 3 ("Supervised
exchanges may be court ordered or arranged by the parent and are generally

appropriate when there is no question about the safety of the child but when one or
both parents do not feel safe or comfortable interacting directly with the other.")
10See Robert B. Straus & Eve Alda, Supervised Child Access: The Evolution of a
Social Service, 32 FAM & CONCILIATION CTS.REV. 230, 231 (1994) ("In separated or

divorced families conflict between the parents is what brings child access problems to
the attention of the state ....The issues involve risks to parents as well as children,

including serious concerns about inter-parental violence."); see also Robert B. Straus,
Supervised Visitation and Family Violence, 29 FAM. L. Q. 229 (1995) (discussing the

heightened risk of violence at custody exchanges and during visitation in domestic
violence situations)
1 Barbara E. Flory et al., Supervised Access and Exchange: An Exploratory
Study of Supervised Access and Custody Exchange Services: The ParentalExperience,
39 FAM. CT. REV. 469, 470 (2001) (pointing out that increased levels of child support
enforcement have led to more interest on the part of absent parents in establishing
parental relationships with their children).
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inappropriate behaviors or situations. Often the goals of such temporary
supervision are not only to protect the child until an accurate assessment of
threat to the child can be undertaken, but also to deliver services to the child
and parent with the goal that supervision may no longer be necessary at some
future point in time.' 2 If a court finds that a parent subjected his or her child to
such conduct or circumstances, longer term supervision may be ordered to
continue the contact of the child with the parent 13even where there is no realistic
possibility that ordinary access will be possible.
The growth of supervised access to children reflects larger trends in
custody law. The absence of clear judicial rules in the area of custody has
contributed to an increase in conflict and in strategic litigation behavior by
parents.' 4 In highly conflicted cases, supervised access is a tool that can protect
children from some aspects of parental conflict. However, supervised access
can also be used as part of a litigation strategy by parents who seek to gain an
advantage and to exercise dominion over the other parent. 15 Furthermore,
courts may award supervised visitation in high-conflict cases to provide a
perceived buffer for the children when the court cannot or does not get to the
bottom of the dispute.16 Second, the move of courts toward a paradigm of postdivorce shared parenting and custody determinations resulting from

12

Martha Bailey, Supervised Access: A Long Term Solution?, 37 FAM. &

CONCILIATION CTS REV. 478, 478-79 (1999).
13 See Id. at 479 (describing disagreement

over whether the use of supervised

access is appropriate in cases in which there is not a realistic possibility that ordinary
access will be possible in the future).
"4 See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying
text.
15 See, e.g., Little v. Linder v. Johnson, 206 WL 3425021 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006)
(each parent sought sole custody with supervised access for the other parent in high
conflict cases where each alleged alienation by the other parent); Smith, 206 WL
3114376 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006) (supervised access originally ordered because
mothers sever depression posed a possible threat to child; continued supervision after
mother's successful treatment and after five years appeared to be the result of growing
conflict and posturing by the father to ensure his continued primary custody).
16 See, e.g., Lasater v. Lasater, 809 N.E. 2d 380 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). In Lasater,
the mother was aggressively litigious and uncooperative. Despite her ill-conceived
litigation strategy, however, the basis for supervised access to the child is not clear
from the extensive description of the facts in the appellate opinion. Despite the fact
that the mother apparently had substantial custody of the child during the three years of
the pending divorce, the appellate court rejected the mother's arguments against
supervised access to her son and concluded that supervised visits were appropriate
based on "an abundance of findings relating to the acrimonious relationship between
the parties, the erratic behavior of [the mother], the history of not cooperating with or
following court orders, and the risk of emotional harm [the mother] poses to [the
child]." Id. at 402. Yet, no evidence is described in the appellate opinion regarding the
actual emotional or psychological situation of the child. See id.
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compromise and settlement17 has made it increasingly difficult to eliminate a
parent's custodial contact with children. Together, these considerations have
made many courts reluctant to eliminate custodial contact between parents and
children. Supervised visitation is a mechanism that enables courts to continue
parental custody in cases even where one parent is a threat to the child or to the
other parent.
Orders requiring some form of shared parenting after divorce are
increasingly common. The support for this conclusion is largely anecdotal.
There is little quantitative research on custody outcomes. The most important
study-by Eleanor Macoby and Robert Mnookin-was conducted in 1990 and
is thus fairly dated. 18 In that study of California custody cases, joint physical
custody of children was common. Even when neither parent requested joint
physical custody, courts awarded it in more than a third of the cases.1 9 The
study established that the higher the level of conflict the more likely the
imposition of joint custody was (resulting from pressure to compromise). 20 Not
only is joint custody used as a mechanism for settling high-conflict custody
cases, this result is pushed by the law in a number of jurisdictions that impose

Recently, Jana Singer and Jane Murphey have described the procedural aspects
of this shift as consisting of a number of factors: 1) skepticism about the value of the
adversary system in family law cases; 2) the view that family disputes are "not discrete
events but rather are ongoing social and emotional processes;" 3) a forward-looking
focus on family reorganization as opposed to a backward-looking focus on family
dissolution; 4) an effort to build capacity to enable families to resolve their own
conflicts; and 5) an emphasis on preventative approaches to family conflict. Jana
Singer & Jane Murphey, Resolving Family Conflicts: Implications of a Paradigm Shift,
Presented at the Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting (Jan. 6, 2007)
(on file with the author). Some dispute the notion that joint custody is the pervasive
norm in custody arrangements. See, e.g. Katherine Bartlett, U.S. Custody Law and
17

Trends in the Context of the ALl Principlesand the Law of Family Dissolution, 10 VA.
J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 5, 21-27 (2002).
18 ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL
AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 149 (1992).
'9 Id.; see also Steven J. Bahr, et al., Trends in Child Custody Awards: Has the
Removal of Maternal Preference Made a Difference?, 28 FAM. L. Q. 247, 258 (1994)

(relying on census data to conclude that 30% of divorcing couples have joint physical
custody of their children). But see Robert E. Emery, Postdivorce Family Life for
Children: An Overview of Research and Some Implications for Policy, in THE POST

3, 6 (Ross A. Thompson &
Paul R. Amato eds. 1999) (estimating that joint physical custody involves less than 5%
of children nationally).
20 MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 18, at 149-51 ("[J]oint custody is in
fact
being used to resolve highly conflicted cases .... The combined data show that the use
of joint physical custody becomes more frequent toward the top of the [conflict]
pyramid.").
DIVORCE FAMILY: CHILDREN, PARENTING AND SOCIETY
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a statutory presumption in favor of joint custody. 21 Even where sole custody is
ordered, the non-custodial parent is given significant visitation in most
instances. The West Virginia Supreme Court articulated the prevailing view:
"[e]ven where there are allegations of abuse and/or neglect, parents whose
rights have not been terminated generally have a right to continued contact
with the child, although such visitation may be supervised for the protection of
the child., 22 To be sure, the research seems to indicate that, on the whole, joint
physical custody is good for children. 23 This movement towards the continuing
involvement of both parents has overshadowed the question of when
continuing contact with a parent should be eliminated. Supervised access is
often the vehicle by which potentially dangerous and disruptive parental
involvement with children is perpetuated.
Despite the growing frequency with which supervised access is ordered
by courts, little research on the impact of supervision on children has been
undertaken.24 A growing body of research details the role of supervised access
in reducing the level of conflict between parents and decreasing the frequency
of parental interaction with the courts. 25 Research also documents parents'26
perceptions of their children's adjustment during supervised access.
Certainly, to the extent this research indicates that supervised access reduces
levels of conflict, improves parenting behavior, and leads to more realistic
expectations of parents, we can infer that supervised access is beneficial to
children. Yet, we know little about children's perceptions of supervised access,
how or whether supervised access alters a child's relationship with parents, or
whether children are able to emerge from supervised access with the possibility

21

D.C.

CODE

ANN. §16-914 (2001);

FLA. STAT. §

61.13(2) (b) (1997);

IDAHO

§32-717B (1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-610(1994); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
132 (1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19A, §1653 (1964); MISS. CODE ANN. §93-5-24
(2004); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.375 (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. Ann. § 148:17 (1992);
CODE

N.M.

STAT. ANN. §40-9.1 (West 1978);
22 State ex rel. George B.W. v.

WIS.

STAT.

§ 767.41(2)(am) (West 2006).

Kaufman, 483 S.E. 2d 852, 857-58 (W. Va.

1997).

See Robert Bauserman, Child Adjustment in Joint-Custody Versus SoleCustody Arrangements, 16 J. FAM. PSYCH. 91 (2002) (meta-analysis of 33 studies);
Janet R. Johnston, High-Conflict Divorce, 4 FUTURE OF CHILD. 165 (1994)
23

(summarizing the social science research on joint custody).
24 Rachel Birnbaum & Ramona Alaggia, Supervised Visitation: A Call
for a
Second Generation of Research, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 119, 120 (2006) (arguing that most
of the research is descriptive of programs or involves very small programs and
concluding that "there is a gap in the literature that examines parent/child outcomes

and the intended and unintended consequences of supervised visitation between
children and their parents").
25 See, e.g., Flory et al., supra note 11; Jennifer Jenkins et al., An Evaluation of
Supervised Access II."Perspectivesof Parentsand Children, 35 FAM. & CONCILIATION
CTS. REV. 51 (1997).
26

See note 25 supra and sources cited therein.
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of a normal relationship with parents. Most importantly, we do not know
whether supervised access actually protects the best interests of children who
have continued contact with an abusive, manipulative and/or threatening
parent. Nor have we examined the impact of supervised access to a child on the
ability of the other parent to build a new family unit and move past the custody
dispute. These questions are especially important in situations in which the
parent-child interactions will be supervised over a long period of time or the
child resists the court-ordered supervised contact with a parent.
Also missing from our approach to supervised access is a coherent set of
principles regarding when and under what conditions supervised access should
be ordered by courts.27 This absence of substantive standards may be a direct
reflection of our lack of understanding of supervised access. Many
jurisdictions have adopted detailed standards for the provision of supervised
access services. 28 Yet few have articulated substantive guidelines for the
imposition of supervised access beyond the physical safety or best interests of
the child.
Our lack of understanding of the impact of supervision on children and
the absence of coherent guidelines for courts raises two pragmatic concerns.
First, courts may order supervised access under circumstances in which parentchild contact should be suspended. Second, courts may be continuing parentchild contact because of the perceived buffer it provides under circumstances
in which contact is detrimental to the child(ren) involved. Thus, my central
question is under what circumstances should supervised access be ordered?
Given that the central legal command in all states is to fashion a custody
arrangement that is in the child's best interests, what considerations should
warrant the intervention of a court-appointed supervisor in the parent-child
relationship, and what considerations should warrant the continuation of
contact between a child and a parent who threatens a child's health, well-being
or safety? As part of these questions, I will also examine whether supervised
access provisions contain adequate safeguards to accomplish their objectives of
protecting children.

27
28

See, infra, note 28 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § ll0.1a. (West 2006); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 16(o).

For a typical example of detailed standards, see
STANDARDS

AND

GUIDELINES

FOR

SUPERVISED VISITATION NETWORK,

SUPERVISED

VISITATION

PRACTICE,

http://www.svnetwork.net/StandardsAndGuidelines.html
(2004). The process of
developing the standards and guidelines is discussed in Robert B. Straus et al.,
Standards and Guidelinesfor Supervised Visitation Network Practice: Introductory
Discussion, 36 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 96 (1998).
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II. THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF CUSTODY AND VISITATION

Supervised access has emerged as a response to increasingly intractable
child custody disputes. 29 The difficulty of custody determinations is the result
of many factors. The central legal test for allocating custodial rights-the "best
interest of the child" test-has lost its historic substantive content as genderbased parenting roles have been eroded. 30 Changing norms regarding the roles
of men and women at work and within the family have led to expectations (if
not reality) of shared parenting and equal economic status. 31 As a result, family
organization no longer fits an established pattern and, in many situations, both
parents will work in the paid labor force and will be involved in parenting
children not32only while relationships are intact but also in the wake of family
breakdown.
Significant theoretical and pragmatic focus has been directed to the impact of
high-conflict custody litigation on children. See Linda D. Elrod, Reforming the System
29

to Protect Children in High Conflict Custody Cases, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 495
(2001); Janet R. Johnston, High Conflict Divorce, 4 FUTURE OF CHILD. 165 (1994);
Hildy Mauzerall, et al., Protecting the Children of High Conflict Divorce: An Analysis
of the Idaho Bench/Bar Committee to Protect Children of High Conflict Divorce's
Report to the Idaho Supreme Court, 33 IDAHO L. REV. 291 (1997); Sarah Ramsey, The
Wingspread Report and Action Plan, High Conflict Custody Cases: Reforming the
System for Children, 18 FAM. CT. REV. 146 (2001); Andrew Schepard, The Evolving
JudicialRole in Child Custody Disputes: From Fault Finder to Conflict Manager to
Differential Case Management, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 395 (2000); High
Conflict Custody Cases: Reforming the System for Children-Conference Report and
Action Plan, 34 FAM. L. Q. 589 (2001).
30 Elizabeth Scott, Pluralism, ParentalPreference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL.

L. REV. 615, 619-22 (1992).

See Solangel Maldanado, Beyond Economic Fatherhood: Encouraging
Divorced Fathers to Parent, 153 U. PA L. REV. 921, 943-46 (2005) (documenting the
growing expectation that fathers will be involved in their children's lives after divorce
31

while at the same time arguing that expectations of paternal involvement are still
ambiguous and that many fathers disengage from their children when they divorce the
children's mother); see also Stephanie B. Goldberg, Make Room for Daddy, 83 A.B.A.
J. 48, 49 (1997) (discussing the growth of the fathers' rights movement); Arlene
Broward Huber, Children at Risk in the Politics of Child Custody Suits:
Acknowledging Their Needs for Nurture, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 33, 45-46

(1994) (pointing out that divorcing fathers have a better chance of prevailing in
disputes over custody under the best interests and joint custody approach of modem
courts).
32 See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 3-4
(1981) (identifying changes in lines of authority and roles within the family as one of
the major characteristics that distinguishes late 20th Century families); Martha

JOURNAL OF LAW & FAMILY STUDIES

[Vol. 9

The dual involvement of mothers and fathers in post-divorce parenting is
one of the factors that has driven the increase in custody disputes-both
parents expect continuing contact with their children. The growth of intractable
custody litigation has also been fueled by the legal context in which custody
issues are decided. The 'best interests of the child' test does not provide a
meaningful standard for allocating custodial rights between parents. Joint
custody has resulted in a focus on parental rights. This rights orientation in
custody determinations has made it increasingly difficult for courts to curtail or
eliminate a parent's custodial rights.
A. Best Interests of the Child-A Little History
The central directive to courts in adjudicating the custody of children is to
serve the best interests of the child.3 3 This principle has been the touchstone of
custody law since the latter half of the 19th century.3 4 Until the last quarter of

Albertson Fineman, Progress and Progressionin Family Law, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
1, 2-3 (arguing that profound shifts in our understanding of family disclose serious
issues regarding how we care for children and the elderly); see also Scott supra note
30, at 616-17 (arguing that custody decisions should be based on the past relationship
of each parent with the child, pointing out that the tender years doctrine reflected the
actual role of the mother as the central nurturing figure in the life of her child and
suggesting that the abandonment of that test and the adoption of an open-ended best
interests test reflects the law's struggle to decide custody cases without the guidance of
differentiated gender roles within the family).
33 The custody law of every state is expressly built on this standard. See Jeff
Atkinson, Criteriafor Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate Courts, 18
FAM. L. Q. 1, 5 (1984) ("'Best interest of the child' is the universal standard for
deciding child custody when custody is initially determined at the time of dissolution
of marriage."); see also Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in
Family Law: "Same-Sex" Marriage Issue Dominates Headlines, 38 FAM. L. Q. 777,
810 (2005) (summarizing the law of all 50 states); Chart 2: Custody Criteria,38 FAM.
L. Q. 810, 810 (2005) (summarizing the factors applied in evaluating the best interest
of the child in all fifty states); Family Law in the 50 States: 2003-04, 38 FAM. L. Q.
817, 876-910 (2005) (providing a one year snapshot of child custody cases in the 50
states). The "best interests of the child" standard is pervasive even in international
child custody law. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art.
9, § 3, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/k2crc.htm (stating that a child who has been separated from a
parent has a right "to maintain personal relations and direct contact with that parent,
except if contrary to the child's best interests").
34 MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE
HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 49-50, 61-62 (1994) (discussing

movement away from a father's rights approach to custody toward a maternal
preference evidenced by the best interest standard and the tender years doctrine); see
also

MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING

CENTURY AMERICA,

THE HEARTH: LAW AND FAMILY IN 19TH

237-42 (1985) (discussing the shift from paternal to maternal
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the 20th Century, courts and social scientists assumed that the best interests of
the child were served through a preference for maternal custody.35 This
preference was played out through the formal use of the tender years
presumption and through less formal imposition of normative assumptions by
both judges and parents about appropriate custody arrangements.3 6
The assumption of maternal custody thrived in a context in which divorce
was not a socially accepted practice and was difficult to obtain. 37 Less frequent
divorce meant less frequent custody adjudications.38 Custody litigation
between unmarried individuals was even less common than between divorcing
parents, and the preference for maternal custody in cases involving unmarried
parents was even stronger.39 Formal adjudication of custody between
unmarried parents was unusual. Rather, out-of-wedlock births were often
hidden and the allocation of parenting responsibilities handled through private
ordering and interfamilial arrangements that reflected social norms of maternal

custody that occurred as custody analysis shifted from a property-based analysis to the
best interests standard); Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American
Family Law: Child Custody Adoption and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw U. L. REV.
1038, 1085 (1979) (arguing that the decline of property analysis of family relationships
and the advent of child and relationship centered custody decision-making signaled the
rise of an indigenous American family law).).
15 See, e.g., GROSSBERG, supra note 34; at 239-43; see also MASON, supra
note

34, at 61-2; Lenore J. Weitzman & Ruth B. Dixon, Child Custody Awards: Legal
Standards and Empirical Patterns for Child Custody, Support and Visitation After
Divorce, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 479 (1979); Developments in the Law-The
Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1333-34 (1980).
36 MASON, supra note 34, at 123; Jeff Atkinson, Criteriafor Deciding
Custody in
the Trial and Appellate Courts, 18 FAM. L. Q. 1, 4-16 (1984).
37 The rate of divorce increased steadily after the Civil War until the mid 1960's
when it sharply increased. Frank N. Furstenberg Jr., History and Current Status of
Divorce in the United States, THE FUTURE OF CHILD., Spring 1994, at 29, 30-31.
Furstenberg points out that throughout the 2 0 th century the institution of marriage was
losing its centrality and experiencing increasing instability. Id. Yet public policy

makers did not really recognize the development until after the rate of divorce spiked
in the mid 1960's. Id.
3"Id. at 34-35 ("Since the 1950s when the rates of [family] stability were at their
highest point, the risk of family disruption has more than doubled, owing to much
higher rates of divorce and separation and, more recently, an explosion of non-marital
childbearing.").
39 The common law, reflecting a negative view of both women and of children

born out of wedlock, recognized no legal relationship between an unwed father and his
children born outside of marriage. See GROSSBERG, supra note 34, at 197-98, 234-36;
MASON, supra note 34, at 14-18. This regime was only lifted when children's rights
advocates sought to undermine the stigma of illegitimacy and the unequal treatment of
illegitimate children. See, e.g., Mary L. Shanley, Unwed Fathers' Rights, Adoption and
Sex Equality: Gender-Neutrality and the Perpetuation of Patriarchy,95 COLUM. L.
REV. 60, 67-68 (1995)
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care for children.4 ° Many states had statutory presumptions that unwed fathers
were unfit parents, for example. 41 To the extent courts became formally
involved in these non-marital families it was often in the context of paternity
and adoption.4 2
Until recently, legal questions regarding the best interests of the child
were more easily resolved in the context of a socially cohesive regime that
disfavored divorce and out-of wedlock birth and applied a consistent
assumption that in those instances where the adjudication of parental rights did
occur, maternal custody was preferred.43 As divorce became more common
and experimentation with alternative relationships grew, as non-marital childbearing increased, 44 and the stigma of illegitimacy waned, 45 and as the basic
social, economic and familial roles of men and women changed, the
commitment to a maternal custody preference disintegrated.46
Notwithstanding these social, economic and familial changes, our custody
adjudication system still functions on the central premise of serving the best
interests of the child. Yet no consistent subtext has emerged to fill the gap left
40

See

GROSSBERG,

supra note 34, at 200-07;

MASON,

supra note 34, at 144-49

(describing late 20th century changes in ideas of parenting that affected the

relationships of unwed fathers and mothers with their children).
41 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647-48 (1972).
42 See GROSSBERG, supra note 34, at 215-30 (describing 19th
Century
developments in paternity law).
43 Mary Ann Mason observes, "[w]hile [the tender years doctrine]...
undoubtedly caused some unfairness, it did focus on the child's needs for nurture and
stability rather than on the parents' rights to access. It also discouraged dispute, since
society's attitudes were aligned with the law's judgment about what was best for
children." THE CUSTODY WARS 2 (1999).

Ira Mark Eilman, Divorce Rates, Marriage Rates, and the Problematic
Persistence of TraditionalMarital Roles, 34 FAM. L. Q. 1, 6-7 (2000) (summarizing
44

data which shows the increase in the rate of non-marital births and indicating that the
rate has leveled and even declined during the 1990s).
45 See Thomas Healy, Stigmatic Harm and Standing, 92 IOWA L. REV. 417, 47880 (2007) ("The stigma of illegitimacy has lessened somewhat over time as the number
of illegitimate births has increased and as alternative models of the family have
become more accepted."); cf Lili Mostofi, Legitimizing the Bastard: The Supreme
Court's Treatment of the Illegitimate Child, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 453 (2004)
(reviewing United States Supreme Court precedent striking down laws that

discriminate against illegitimate children).

46 ANDREW CHERLIN, MARRIAGE DIVORCE

&

REMARRIGE

55 (rev. ed. 1992)

(concluding that even though the link between the increase in divorce rates and
women's participation in the workforce between 1960 and 1980 is "circumstantial,...
it is stronger and more suggestive than that linking any other concurrent trend with the
rise in divorce"). Nonetheless, this link could be attributable to any of a number of
factors including the fact that increased employment not only undermined their marital
roles but also afforded them the opportunity to exit bad marriages. Ellman, supra note
44, at 13-14.
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by the abandonment of the maternal custody preference. Feminists focus on
past parental roles and the relationship of those roles to children's well-being
to fashion an approach to resolving custody disputes.4 7 They argue strenuously
that women and children are disadvantaged by the abandonment of maternal
preferences because gender-neutral approaches to custody deny the reality that
women are still most often the primary nurturers of children.48 Likewise,
advocates for fathers' rights focus on parental roles, but with a more
prospective approach. 49 The central theme of their advocacy is that the breakup

of the family changes the dynamics and that the new context must be
considered to ensure a role for fathers in their children's lives. Thus, fathers'
rights advocates seek for a custody system that ensures frequent and continuing
contact with both parents.5°
More pragmatic advocates seek to minimize the conflict in custody
litigation and impose procedural norms and court management regimes that
emphasize peaceful settlement and compromise of custody disputes. The
pragmatists have largely abandoned the effort to articulate a substantive
standard beyond the best interests of the child for the resolution of custody
disputes and have instead focused on the process of custody litigation. This
focus has emphasized mechanisms to force settlement of disputes, minimizing
conflict when custody is not settled, and controlling the consequences of
custody disputes. Supervised access to children is a procedural tool in this
pragmatic approach to custody dispute resolution.51

4' Fineman,
48

supra note 32, at 12-13; Scott, supra note 30, passim.

Margaret F. Brinig, Feminism and Child Custody under Chapter Two of the

American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 301, 302 (2001) (praising the allocation standard for its
implementation of feminist principles).
49 See RICHARD A. WARSHAK, THE CUSTODY REVOLUTION: THE FATHER FACTOR
AND THE MOTHERHOOD MYSTIQUE 125-52 (1992) (advocating for a shift from a

maternal focus to consideration of children's potential relationships with fathers);
Thomas J. Simone, Great Expectations: New York's Attempt to Eliminate Gender
Preferences Between Parents in Child Custody Disputes, 24 COLUM. J. L. & Soc.
PROB. 457, 460-67 (1991) (advocating a focus on potential relationships to eliminate
perceived gender bias from custody laws).
50 Goldberg, supra note 31,
at 49.

"' For example, the paradigm shift identified by Singer and Murphey is almost
exclusively procedural in nature. Singer & Murphey, supra note 17 (focusing on the
advent of mediation, court connected family services, mediation and other procedural
reforms as evidence of a paradigm shift).
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B. The Problem of Indeterminacy
The indeterminate best interests test 52 has had significant consequences
for the resolution of child custody disputes. One argument is that
indeterminacy permits judges to act out their own, or even societal, biases in
the determination of custody.? Another argument is that indeterminacy
insulates trial court decision-making from appellate review-making trial
courts a "law unto themselves" in the area of custody.54 Still another suggests

52

See, e.g., Katherine T. Bartlett, Preference,Presumption, Predisposition,and

Common Sense: From TraditionalCustody Doctrines to the American Law Institute's
Family Dissolution Project, 36 FAM. L. Q. 11, 11-12 (2002) (summarizing the
indeterminacy critique of the best interest of the child test and the decision of the
American Law Institute's Family Dissolution Project to adopt a parental
approximation standard); Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond Best Interests of the Child:
Reexamining Child Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota's Four Year
Experiment with the Primary Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REV. 427, 442-50
(1990) (arguing that the certainty provided by the primary caretaker standard was an
attractive response to the indeterminacy of the general best interests standard); Jon
Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 1(1987)
"These two features-the knowledge that the decision will have
momentous importance for the parties directly involved and the recognition
that it may not be possible to have a rational preference for one parent over
the other-conspire to create a psychological tension in decision makers
that many will be unable to tolerate. Often, they will resolve this tension by
adopting an irrational belief in the possibility of a rational preference."
Robert Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 226, 255-61 (1975) (analyzing the
inherent indeterminacy of child custody determinations under an undifferentiated best
interests standard).
" See, e.g., Elster, supra note 52, at 14-15 (arguing that the indeterminacy of the
best interest test not only invites but requires judges to impose value judgments on the
parties in custody adjudications); Mnookin, supra note 52, at 263 (arguing that the
indeterminate standard of best interests means that judges rely on "unarticulated
predilections and preferences," raising the risk that custody will be decided based on
"values not widely shared in our society"); Steven N. Peskind, Determining the
Undeterminable: The Best Interest of the Child Standard as an Imperfect but
Necessary Guidepost to Determine Child Custody, 25 N. ILL. L. REV. 449, 457 (2005)
(noting that indeterminate standards which provide little concrete guidance contribute
"to the problem of reliance on the subjective preferences of the fact finder").
54 See Crippen, supra note 52, at 443-44 (discussing the limited nature of
appellate review even in the face of efforts to facilitate such review); Peskind, supra
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that indeterminacy discourages peaceful settlement of disputes and encourages
strategic behavior by parents in divorce cases that is not related to the best
interests of the child.55
Whatever the other impacts of an indeterminate custody standard, it
clearly pushes most custody decision making away from the ends of a
continuum: one end of which is sole maternal custody and the other end of
which is sole paternal custody. Without clear rules to guide their decisions,
most judges opt for uncontroversial custody determinations that will be
insulated from appellate review. Especially in custody litigation where a
judge's decision is subject to on-going modification, the indeterminate
standards also push judges to make decisions to try to keep the parties happy.5 6

note 53, at 461-62 (recognizing that "not only is a trial court required to struggle
through the thicket of the unknown, the appellate court does not consider itself in a
position, because of the trial court's unique opportunity to evaluate the witnesses first
hand, to challenge the trial court's omniscience").
55 See Mnookin, supra note 52, at 262-64 (arguing that indeterminacy makes the
outcome of litigation difficult to predict and thus encourages more litigation); Robert
H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 963-66 (1979) (arguing that uncertainty increases strategic
tradeoffs of custody for other perceived benefits at divorce that do not serve the best
interests of children). Katharine Bartlett crystallizes the role played by indeterminacy
in forcing settlement as follows:
the [best interest of the child] standard allows so much judicial discretion
that Jane and David may find it hard to predict what the court will do. Either
party may win and, thus, each has reason to secure his or her respective
advantage, most likely at the expense of cooperation with the other. For
example .... [the father] may ask for primary custody, even if he does not
want it, to create some negotiating room. He may attempt to build his
reputation as the more responsible parent by alienating... [the mother]
from the court-appointed psychiatrist, the children's teachers, or the parents
of the children's friends. [The mother] ... , for her part, may begin to
exclude [the father] ... from decisionmaking, or suggest to the children in
subtle, or not-so-subtle, ways, that their father is a real drag. None of these
strategies is likely to benefit the children.
Katharine T. Bartlett, Child Custody in the 21st Century: How the American Law
Institute Proposes to Achieve Predictability and Still Protect the Individual Child's
Best Interests, 35 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 467, 470-72 (1990).
56 Mnookin and Elster point out that indeterminacy leads to compromise. Elster,
supra note 52, at 12-17; Mnookin, supra note 52, at 255-61; Mnookin & Kornhauser,
supra note 55, at 963-66.
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C. Primary Caretakers and ApproximationWorkable New Standardsfor Custody Adjudication?
A number of substantive tests have been proposed in various attempts to
fill the gap left by the abandonment of the maternal preference and to limit the
indeterminate nature of the best interest of the child standard. In the 1980's
some states experimented with the "primary caretaker" presumption.57 This
presumption dictated the award of custody based on the courts finding as to
which parent has been the primary caregiver for the child. The test had the
merit of seeking the best interests of the child by preserving the most
significant care-giving relationship in the child's life. The jurisdictions that
adopted this standard, however, have all abandoned the formal presumption.
In Minnesota, the primary caretaker presumption did not lead to reduced
litigation in custody disputes; rather the presumption may have fueled
additional 59litigation as parties battled over the definition of "primary

caretaker.

57 See Crippen, supra note 52, at 428-31 (describing Minnesota's four year

judicial experiment with the primary caretaker standard which was eventually
overruled by the Minnesota legislature). For critiques of the primary caregiver
standard, see David Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes
in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 527-38 (1984) which explains the primary
caregiver standard generally and discussing its critiques; Marcia O'Kelly, Blessing the
Tie that Binds: Preferencefor the Primary Caretakeras Custodian, 63 N.D. L. REV.
481, passim (1987); Laura Sack, Women and Children First: A Feminist Analysis of
the Primary Caretaker Standard in Child Custody Cases, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
291, passim (1992); and Elizabeth Scott, Pluralism, PaternalPreference and Child
Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615, 618-29 (1992).
58 The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the primary caretaker presumption in
Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W. 2d 705 (Minn. 1985), but backed away from the
presumption four years later in Sefkow v. SeJkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 212 (Minn. 1988).
For further discussion of Minnesota's primary caretaker presumption, see Crippen,
supra note 52, at 428-29. In articulating the applicable standard, the Minnesota
Supreme Court relied on a case from West Virginia, Garska v. McCoy, 278 S. E. 2d
357 (W. Va. 1981). In 2001, West Virginia legislatively adopted the American Law
Institute's approximation standard. 2001 W. Va. Acts 91(codified at W. VA. CODE §
48-9-206). For further materials related to the primary caretaker presumption see
Richard Neely, The Primary CaretakerParentRule: Child Custody and the Dynamics
of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 168 (1984) and Kathryn L. Mercer, The Ethics of
JudicialDecision-MakingRegarding Custody of Minor Children: Looking at the "Best
Interests of the Child" and the "Primary Caretaker" Standards as Utility Rules, 33
IDAHO L. REV. 389, passim (1997), comparing cases applying an undifferentiated best
interests test with cases applying a primary caretaker presumption and describing the
approach of states adopting the primary caretaker presumption.
59 See Crippen, supra note 52, at 454-55, 456 tbls.l-1 & 1-2, 457 tbls.2-1 & 2-2,
458 tbl.2-3, 459-60 (discussing the results of a survey concerning the effectiveness of
the primary caretaker standard in reducing litigation).
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More recently the drafters of the American Law Institute's Principles of
Family Dissolution (ALl Principles), 60 have re-articulated the primary
caretaker standard as the "approximation standard.",6 1 The ALL Principles are
unique in a number of respects. They defer to parental decision-making
regarding the child's residential custody arrangements by requiring courts to
approve a parenting plan entered into knowingly and voluntarily by the parents
unless the plan would be harmful to the child.62 If parents cannot agree to a
parenting plan, the ALI Principles recommend that custody 'approximate' the
role the parents played in parenting the child during the marriage.6 3 While the
ALI's approximation standard has been noted and considered by many courts,
it has not been widely adopted as the decisional rule for custody cases.64
D. Joint PhysicalCustody and Shared Parenting
The trend in custody awards is toward joint physical custody and shared
parenting. Beginning in the 1970s, in response to efforts by the fathers' rights
movement, courts and state legislatures began to seriously consider awards of
joint physical custody of children.65 Most states today have adopted legislation
authorizing courts to award joint physical custody of children even over the
objection of one or both of the parents.66 Some states impose a presumption in
favor of joint custody of children.67 In a significant number of cases, both
parents have the right to substantial physical time with their children. Custody

60 AM LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONALI PRINCIPLES (2000) [hereinafter ALI Principles].
61 The ALI Principles are an attempt to recommend best practices in the

area of

family dissolution. See generally Marygold S. Melli, The American Law Institute
Principles of Family Dissolution, the Approximation Rule and Shared-Parenting,25
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 347, 347-48 (2005).
62 ALI PRINCIPLES § 2.05, at 143 (2000).
63 Id. § 2.08. The approximation rule was first proposed by Professor Elizabeth
Scott. See generally Scott, supra note 30.
64 In 2001 the West Virginia Legislature adopted a statute replacing the primary
caretaker standard that had been adopted by the West Virginia courts with a standard
similar to the ALI approximation standard. 2001 W. Va. Acts 91 (codified at W. VA.
CODE § 48-9-206).
65 Chambers, supra note 57 (evaluating both the reform in progress during the
1980s and the forces behind competing approaches to custody including joint custody);
Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L. J. 455,
455-58 (1984) (summarizing the movement toward joint custody); Jana B. Singer &
William L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L. REV. 497, 500-502
(1984) (summarizing the rationale for joint custody).
66 Judith Bond Jennison, The Searchfor Equality in a Women 's World: Father's
Rights to Child Custody, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1141, 1147-48 (1991) (reporting that 38
states had adopted statutes authorizing the use of joint custody).
67 See supra note 21.
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orders today reflect the effort to ensure that both parents maintain continuing
involvement in the lives of their children.68 Both fathers' rights advocates and
pragmatists have either advocated for or endorsed joint custody as an approach
to custody disputes. For fathers' rights proponents, joint custody represents the
best opportunity for substantial paternal involvement in children's lives after
family breakdown. 69 Pragmatists have been attracted both by the ideal of
gender neutrality that is embodied in joint custody and the opportunity for
compromise that joint custody offers.7 °
E. Filling the Gap by Managing Cases

In addition to casting about for a decisional standard to reign in the bestinterest standard, many courts have instituted procedural rules to shape the
process of adjudicating custody. These rules often push parents toward nonjudicial decision-making and institute efforts to reduce or diffuse parental
conflict. 71 This procedural approach may reduce the number of cases that end
up going to trial. Procedural approaches may also be successful in diffusing
and reducing the level of conflict in some families. However, they do not
provide a framework for deciding the cases that do go to the judge for
resolution. Thus, all of the procedural mechanisms that courts adopt operate
within the context of the best interests of the child test. These mechanisms
include parent education workshops, mandatory mediation of custody disputes,
the use of custody managers and intermediaries such as parent coordinators to
facilitate parental collaboration and communication, and the use of guardians
ad litem and others to represent the interests of the child(ren).

68 ANDREW SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS & CUSTODY: INTERDISCIPLINARY
MODELS FOR CHILDREN COURTS & FAMILIES 45-49 (Cambridge 2004).
69

Jennison, supra note 66, at 1148 (noting that fathers' rights groups pushed for

joint custody for equality reasons).
70 Gerald Hardcastle, Joint Custody: A Family Court Judge's Perspective, 32
FAM.

L. Q. 201, 203-04 (1998); Schepard, supra note 29, at 402.

See Barbara Babb, An Interdisciplinary Approach to Family Law
Jurisprudence:Application of an Ecologicaland Therapeutic Perspective, 72 IND. L. J.
71

775, 784-86 (1997); Richard Boldt & Jana B. Singer, Juristocracy in the Trenches:
Problem-Solving Judges and Therapeutic Jurisprudencein Drug Courts and Unified
Family Courts, 65 MD. L. REV. 82, 94 (2006); Christine Coates, et al., Parenting
Coordinationfor High Conflict Families, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 246, 246-47 (2004) ("The
past two decades have seen a progressive development of alternative dispute resolution
processes within the family court system."); Gregory Firestone and Janet Weinstein, In
the Best Interests of Children: A Proposal to Transform the Adversarial System, 42
FAM. CT. REV. 203, 207-212 (2004) (discussing "a comprehensive dispute resolution
program for families experiencing divorce or child protection problems").
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III. SUPERVISED ACCESS

A. The FactualContext
Supervised access provisions are a reflection, at some level, of all of these
forces. Most directly, supervised access has been developed in most
jurisdictions as a pragmatic tool for the management of intractable or difficult
custody cases. 72 To the extent that the growing use of joint custody and the
indeterminacy of the best interests of the child standard have lead to a situation
in which continuing contact of both parents with children is a norm in custody
disputes, supervised visitation is one of the most important tools we have to
ensure child safety. However, at the margin, my concern is that supervised
access is a stopgap that relieves judges of the responsibility of eliminating
parental contact with children where such contact is not in the child(ren)'s best
interests.
In most states the decision to order supervised access to children is in the
discretion of the trial judge 3 Very few states or local courts have attempted to
articulate guidelines for the exercise of that discretion other than the immediate
safety of the child or general best interest of the child test. 74 Most supervised
access cases involve serious allegations of parental misconduct aimed either at
children and/or at the other parent. In most of the cases, there is a record of
family violence, sexual abuse, extreme custodial interference such as removing
the child to a foreign country, or parental conduct that is divisive and

72

Bonnie S. Newton, Visitation Centers: A Solution Without Critics, FLA. B.J.,

(Jan. 1997), at 54, 57; Ramsey, supra note 29, at 152; Thomas Schacht, Prevention
Strategies to ProtectProfessionalsand FamiliesInvolved in High-ConflictDivorce, 22
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 565, 581(2000).

73 See Kryvanis v. Kruty, 733 N.Y.S. 2d 297, 299 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)
(declining to modify order of supervised access stating that "[it] is well settled... that
the determination of whether visitation should be supervised ' ... is a matter left to
Family Court's sound discretion ... ') (internal citation omitted); Willis v. Willis,
775 N.E. 2d 878, 886 (Ohio App. 2002) (upholding court ordered supervision stating
that "[i]t is well established that the trail court has broad discretion in determining
matters relating to visitation").
74 See Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.400 (2005) (providing for visitation unless it would
"endanger the child's physical health or impair his or her emotional development" and
imposing a presumption of supervised visitation where a parent has been convicted of
certain sex offenses or criminal child abuse). A number of courts have expressly held
that the only limit on the Court's exercise of discretion in an award of supervised
visitation is the best interests of the child. Willis, 775 N.E. 2d at 886. See also Abranko
v. Vargas, 810 N.Y.S.2d 509, 510 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (denying motion to modify
visitation eliminating provision for supervision stating "[t]he standard ultimately to be
applied, however, remains what is in the best interest of the child .... ."); Sedgwick v.
Sedgwick, 2002 WL 651607, *3 (Tex. App. 2002) ("The trial court may place
conditions on visitation if they are necessary for the best interest of the child.").
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damaging to children. Although the cases are incredibly diverse, they tend to
fall into several distinct categories.
The first group of cases are those in which one or both of the parents is
locked in a pattern of difficult and inappropriate behavior that is thwarting the
process of shared parenting and/or jeopardizing the mental and emotional
health of the children. 75 Willis v. Willis76 is an example of this type of case. 77 In

Willis, the father told the children that he and their mother were still "biblically
married," that the mother's new boyfriend was an "imposter," and that the
mother was an "adulterer"-in addition to which he required the children to
study biblical passages on adultery. 7 Upon receiving a copy of a
psychological report containing statements the children had made about him,
the father flew into a rage and tried to force the children to recant the
statements on videotape. 79 The children had mixed feelings about the father,
reporting that they loved him but did not like his behavior toward their mother.

75

This type of conduct has been the study of much commentary and debate

among family law experts. See Janet R. Johnston, Children of Divorce Who Reject a
Parentand Refuse Visitation: Recent Research and Social Policy Implicationsfor the
Alienated Child, 35 FAM. L. Q. 757, 757-58 (2005) (noting that conduct by one parent
that interferes substantially with the relationship between the other parent and the child
has been labeled "Parental Alienation Syndrome"); see also STANLEY S. CLAWAR &
BRYNNE V. RIVLIN, CHILDREN HELD HOSTAGE: DEALING WITH PROGRAMMED AND
BRAINWASHED CHILDREN (1991); RICHARD A. GARDNER, THE PARENTAL ALIENATION
SYNDROME (2d ed. 1998); John Dunne & Marsha Hedrick, The ParentalAlienation

Syndrome: An Analysis of Sixteen Cases, 21 J. Div. & REMARRIAGE 21 (1994);
Richard Warshak, Bringing Sense to ParentalAlienation: A Look at the Dispute and
the Evidence, 37 FAM. L.Q. 273 (2003); Richard Warshak, Current Controversies

Regarding ParentalAlienation Syndrome, 19 AM. J. FORENSIC

PSYCH.

29 (2001). On

the other hand "advocates for victims of domestic violence argue that the child and the
allied parent have suffered real abuse at the hands of the rejected parent, abuse that has
been largely ignored, dismissed, or greatly minimized by family courts." Johnston,
supra at 758, (citing LUNDY BRANCROFT & JAY G. SILVERMAN, THE BATTERER AS
PARENT: ADDRESSING THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON FAMILY DYNAMICS
(2002)); see also PETER G. JAFFE, NANCY K.D. LEMON & SAMANTHA E. POISSON,
CHILD CUSTODY & DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A CALL FOR SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

(2003); Clare Dalton, When ParadigmsCollide: ProtectingBattered Parentsand Their
Children in the Family Court System, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 273 (1999);
Lenore E.A. Walker, Kristi L. Brantley & Justin A. Rigsbee, A CriticalAnalysis of
ParentalAlienation Syndrome and Its Admissibility in the Family Court. 1 J. CHILD
CUSTODY 47 (2004).

775 N.E. 2d 878.
See also Linder v. Johnson, 2006 WL 3425021 (Ark. App. 2006); Coleman v.
Coleman, 2004 WL 1966083 (Conn. Super. 2004); Tarachanskaya v. Voldarsky, 897
A. 2d 884 (Md. App. 2006); Seitz v. Seitz, 2007 WL 80039 (Ohio App. 2007).
78 Willis, 775 N.E. 2d at 881. Much of this evidence resulted from an in camera
interview
by the trial judge with the children.
79
Id. at 882.
76

77
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Expert testimony established that they were fearful of him and experienced
emotional and physical stress in preparation for visitations with him. The
expert also testified that the father could not acknowledge the effect his
behavior had on his children and was unaware of the emotional trauma to
which he was subjecting them. The trial court's order that the father's
visitation with the children be supervised and that the father attend counseling
for himself and with his children was upheld on appeal.8 °
In the second category of cases, the child's relationship with a parent is
threatened by a risk of parental kidnapping or substantial interference with the
other parent's access to the child. Sedgwick v. SedgwickO8 ' is an example of
such a case. In Sedgwick, the mother fled with the couple's four-year-old
daughter two months after filing for divorce. She kept her whereabouts secret
for several months. After the court entered a final decree of divorce in the
mother's absence, she entered an appearance through her counsel and
requested a new trial. In the meantime, the court ordered supervised visitation
between the child and father. The father and his mother (the paternal
grandmother) twice traveled from Texas to Virginia for the court-ordered
supervised visitation. The mother failed to appear with the child for the
scheduled visitations. During this time, the mother also consistently avoided
service of various documents relating to the case. Based on the mother's flight,
her evasion of service, and her repeated failure to comply with the court's
orders regarding father-child contact, the trial court granted sole custody to the
father and ordered that the mother's access to the child be supervised. This
order was upheld on appeal.82
For recent cases involving allegations of alienating conduct by a parent in
which supervised access was ordered, see Peet v. Parker, 805 N.Y.S. 2d 149 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2005) where a court ordered supervised visitation based on the mother's
repeated attempts to get children to make false allegations of abuse against father;
80

Lasater v. Lasater, 809 N.E. 2d 380 (Ind. App. 2004) where a mother attempted to
undermine the child's relationship with his father and consistently failed to cooperate
with court orders; Goldman v. Link, 824 So. 2d 296 (Fla. App. 2002) where a mother's
visitation was supervised apparently because of her conduct interfering with the
relationship of the child and the father.
81 2002 WL 651607 (Tex. App. 2002).
82 Id. at *1. See also DeVeau v. Azemoto-DeVeau, 2000 WL 1015855 (Va. App.
July 25, 2000) (supervised visitation ordered after the mother fled the jurisdiction with
one of the two children and was detained while attempting to leave the country); Kogel
v. Robertson, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 10028 (Dec. 2, 2005) (Mother fled with child to
Belgium. Texas Ct. Granted sole custody to Father with supervised visitation to
mother. Eventually Belgian Court ordered enforcement of the Texas order and Belgian
officials forcibly removed the child from the mother and returned her to father. Texas
court denied mother's efforts to avoid supervised visitation); Ishmael v. Ismail, 989
S.W. 2d 923 (Ark. App. 1999) (father's visitation supervised because of his repeated
threats to take child out of the country and not let mother see him); Huyak v. Croke,
2003 Iowa App. LEXIS 185 (March 12, 2003) (father visitation supervised because he
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In a third group of cases, the child's health and safety are threatened
because the parent's judgment regarding care for the child is impaired by
mental-health or substance-abuse issues. In the Interest of Walters8 3 is such a
case. In Walters, the mother was an angry alcoholic who would not only drink
until she passed out, leaving her five-year-old son alone and unattended in the
home, but would also have violent rages in front of her child while she was
drunk (including physically attacking her husband in front of her child). Like
the trial court in Sedgwick, the trial court ordered that the mother's contact
with the child be supervised so that it could ensure that she was not abusing
substances during visitations. This order was upheld on appeal. S4
Finally, supervised access to children is often ordered in cases involving
domestic violence. Rodvik v. Rodvik"5 is a recent case in which the court
ordered that the father's access to the children be supervised because he was
tardy, bad-mouthed the mother in front of the children, was abusive to the
mother and repeatedly violated protective orders.8 6 The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's reasoning that "[b]ecause of [the father's] apparent
lack of insight into his children's needs, the harm his actions have done to
them and the necessity that he comply with rules established by the court, it is
in the children's best interests to immediately implement [supervised
access] .. .

These common scenarios capture the majority of cases in which courts
order supervised access. However, they do not capture the cases on the margin
in which supervised access is perpetuating potentially dangerous and divisive
situations. Many of these cases on the margin arise in two contexts. The first
are cases in which a parent has severely physically or sexually abused a child.
For example, in In re Marriage of M.A., 88 the father was awarded supervised
visitation even after he was convicted of committing sodomy on his infant

fled with children to Canada); Shady v. Shady, 858 N.E. 2d 128 (Ind. App. 2006)
(supervised visitation ordered because father was an Egyptian national and
psychological testimony indicated he was at risk to abduct the child).
83 39 S.W.3d 280 (Tex. App. 2001).
84 Id. at 287. See also Virant v. Bunce, 899 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 2005) (father's
visitation supervised after he received a DUI while the child was in the car with him);
Riedeman v. Petrella, 828 A. 2d 538 (R.I. 2003) (visitation supervised because of
mother's continuing abuse of cocaine and prescription drugs leading to her failure to
adequately supervise child); In the Interest of L.A.M., 206 Tex. App. LEXIS 532
(January 24, 2006) (mother's visitation supervised because of continuing substance
abuse problem).
85 151 P.3d 338 (Alaska 2006).
86
Id.at 341-42.

Id. at 345. See also Patterson v. Patterson 207 S.W.3d 179 (Mo. App. 2006);
Kargoe v. Mitchell, 785 N.Y.S.2d 557 (2004); In re Marriage of Pooler, 136 P. 3d
1153 (Or. App. 2006).
88 2004 WL 1048194 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
87
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daughter. The appeal actually arose, not from the original order granting the
father supervised access to his children, but from his subsequent petition for
unsupervised visitation and joint custody filed after he had obtained treatment
for several years. While the court denied his request for visitation with his
daughter who was the victim of his abuse, it permitted continued supervised
visitation with the child-victim's twin brother and ordered counseling to9
determine whether unsupervised visitation might be appropriate in the future.
The second situation involving questionable continuation of parent-child
contact through supervised access involves cases of extreme domestic
violence. This situation is obliquely illustrated by Suttles v. Suttles.90 There, the
father shot his father-in-law in front of his child, and kidnapped his wife and
child in his car, leading the police on a high-speed chase that ended in a
wreck. 9 1 He was convicted of crimes arising from these facts and sentenced to
thirty-five years in prison. While the court rejected the father's petition for
supervised visitation with his child at the prison based on the facts that lead to
his imprisonment,92 it left the courthouse door open for future contact between
the father and the child: "[While] visitation should be suspended until a change
of circumstances can be shown [, d]efendant may .. . petition the trial court to
modify this order upon a demonstration of changed circumstances .... 93
It is simply not clear what purpose is served by holding the children and
custodial parents in cases such as Suttles and M.A. hostage to continuing
contact, or the possibility of such contact, by the abusive parent. The appellate
court in Suttles gave no consideration to the relationship between the child and
the father, if any. In M.A. the child was an infant at the time of the sexual abuse
and does not appear to have had a well established relationship with the
father. 94 The court does not appear to have considered the impact of abuse or
the effect of witnessing violence on the children in either case.95 Nor did the

89 Id. at *4-5; cf Mary D. v. Watt, 338 S.E. 2d 521 (W. Va. 1992) (stating that if
a finding that sexual abuse has occurred is supported by credible evidence, visitation
with the abuser must be supervised).
90 748 S.W.2d 427 (Tenn. 1988).

9' Id. at 428.
92 Id. at 429.

Id. In fact, the court went on to further indicate how the father could stay
involved in the child's life, even if the father could not visit the child. See id. ("Of
course, to prevent the bonds between Defendant and child from being severed
completely, he is free to communicate with his child by telephone or mail or other
means approved by the trial court[.]").
94 M.A. involved different-sex twins who were adopted. The sexual abuse of the
daughter occurred shortly after the adoption. M.A., 2004 WL 1048194, * 1.
95 A growing body of research indicates that children who suffer abuse or who
witness abuse suffer profound emotional, psychological and social harms. See DANIEL
93

J. SONKIN, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS

OF FAMILY VIOLENCE

99 (1987); Pearl S. Berman, Impact of Abusive Marital
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courts in either case consider the difficulty the mothers and children might
experience in building a new family life together when confronted with the
specter of ongoing communication from the fathers, and the possibility
of
96
future, court-ordered contact between the children and their fathers.
More startling is that if the children in these cases had been removed from
their respective homes in an abuse and neglect action based on the abusive
parent's conduct, aggravated circumstances would have existed that would
have relieved the public agency of any responsibility to reunify the abusive
parent and child. 97 Since the children in Suttles and MA. had one appropriate

Relationships on Children, in BATTERING AND FAMILY THERAPY: A FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVE

134, 141-43 (Marsali Hansen & Michele Harway eds., 1993); Lee H.

Bowker et al., On the Relationship Between Wife Beating and Child Abuse, in
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 158, 158-61 (Kersti Yllo & Michele Bograd
eds., 1988); Elaine Hilberman & Kit Munson, Sixty Battered Women, 2 VICTIMOLOGY
460, 463 (1978); Bonnie E. Rabin, Violence Against Mothers Equals violence Against
Children: Understanding the Connections, 58 ALBANY L. REV. 1109, 1113 (1995)
(summarizing and synthesizing the research), citing, PETER G. JAFFE ET AL., CHILDREN
OF BATTERED WOMEN 39 (1990). See also B.B. ROBBIE ROSSMAN ET AL., CHILDREN
AND INTERPARENTAL VIOLENCE: THE IMPACT OF EXPOSURE 11-64 (2000); Jeffrey L.
Edleson, Children's Witnessing of Adult Domestic Violence, 14 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 839 (1999); Gayla Margolin, Effects of Domestic Violence on Children, in
VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN IN THE FAMILY AND THE COMMUNITY 57 (Penelope K.
Trickett & Cynthia J. Schellenbach eds., 1998); Joseph C. McGill, et al., Visitation and

Domestic Violence: A Clinical Model of Family Assessment and Access Planning, 37
FAM. & CONCILIATION COURTS REV. 315 (1999); B.B. Robbie Rossman, Longer Term
Effects of Children'sExposure to Domestic Violence, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE
LIVES OF CHILDREN: THE FUTURE OF RESEARCH, INTERVENTION, AND SOCIAL POLICY

35 (Sandra A. Graham-Bermann & Jeffrey L. Edleson eds., 2001); Alan J. Tompkins
et al., The Plight of Children Who Witness Woman Battering: Psychological
Knowledge and Policy Implications, 18 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 135, 143 (1992); Janis
Wolak & David Finkelhor, Children Exposed to Partner Violence, in PARTNER
VIOLENCE: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF 20 YEARS OF RESEARCH 73 (Jana L.
Jasinksi & Linda M. Williams eds., 1998).

See, e.g., Peter Margulies, Representation of Domestic Violence Survivors as a
New Paradigmof Poverty Law: In Search of Access, Connection, and Voice, 63 Geo.
96

Wash. L. Rev. 1071, 1098-1103 (1995) (discussing the issues experienced by family
violence survivors).
9' States, under the influences of the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of
1997, do not have to make reasonable efforts to reunify a child with parents in an
abuse and neglect proceeding if there is a showing of aggravated circumstances. See 42
U.S.C.A. § 671(15) (West 2007). Aggravated circumstances include a parent's
commission of a felony assault against a child. Id.; see also Terry Lyons, When

Reasonable Efforts Hurt Victims of Abuse: Five Years of the Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997, 26 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 391, 392-93 (2002) (describing the

legislative framework in child abuse and neglect cases regarding aggravated
circumstances).
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parent, however, no such state intervention took place. Thus, the presence of
one appropriate parent in combination with supervised access ensures that
these children will have to continue contact with the bad parent. This is a
perverse result. Apparently the only way for the appropriate parent to avoid
further contact with an abuser, or to protect the child from continued contact
with the abusive parent, is to petition to terminate parental rights-an action
that could likely prove difficult, expensive and unsuccessful. 98
Two rationales can be offered for the continued contact between parents
and children in cases such as Suttles and M.A.. The first is that the parents have
a "right" to such contact with their children. Certainly this rational infuses the
judicial reasoning in these two cases. The Suttles Court notes as a preliminary
matter that "the right of the noncustodial parent to reasonable visitation is
clearly favored" and can only be limited or eliminated "if there is definite
evidence" that "the right [to visitation] would jeopardize the child. . . ."99 This
emphasis on parental rights to visitation is not a nuanced reading of the United
States Supreme Court authority regarding parents' rights. The Supreme Court
has not suggested that the best interests of the child test is inappropriate in
litigation between parents. 0 0 Although there is an argument that the
constitution may protect the interests of noncustodial parents to a greater extent
than previously thought, such protection would certainly give way in the face
of credible evidence of abuse. In both Suttles and M.A., the fathers were
convicted of abusive conduct. Thus, the general suggestion that the rights of
the abusive parent justify continued supervised contact with a child is illconceived.
The second possible rationale for ordering supervised access in cases such
as Suttles and M.A. is that the complete elimination of parent-child contact
would be detrimental to the child. Such detriment could occur because the
child has formed an important and attached relationship with the parent despite

98 Very little discussion of private termination of parental rights has occurred in
the literature. Most termination of parental rights cases arise in the context of public
agency interventions in families. See, e.g., Donald C. Boss, Terminating the ParentChild Legal Relationship as a Response to Child Sexual Abuse, 26 LOY. U. CHI. L. J.
287 (1995); Manvinder Gill, Protecting the Abused Child: It is Time to Reevaluate
Judicial Preferencefor Preserving Parental Custody Rights Over the Rights of the
Child to be Freefrom PhysicalAbuse and Sexual Exploitation, 18 J. Juv. L. 67 (1997).
99 Suttles v. Suttles, 748 S.W.2d 427, 429 (Tenn. 1988) (emphasis added).
100 See David D. Meyer, The ConstitutionalRights of Noncustodial Parents, 34
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1461, 1464 (2006) (noting that while the Court has recognized the
parenting status of some unwed fathers, most noncustodial parents have encountered
frustration when resorting to having rights recognized in the Constitution, including
"impediments relating to standing, jurisdiction, or the merits" which impediments
effectively give the state "considerable discretion" to give one parent a "superior and
dominant childrearing role, without having to prove extraordinary or compelling
grounds").
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the parent's dangerous or inappropriate parenting. Research is necessary to
determine whether and when the continuation of these unproductive, but
attached relationships is appropriate and healthy for the child. We need to
know more about the nature and impact of attachments between children and
bad parents. If the child has formed an attachment relationship with a parent
that is disrupted when the child is separated from the parent, the child may be
harmed. This concept, built on "attachment theory," is often lurking in the back
of decisions to require ongoing supervised contact with a bad parent. Yet
attachment theory is often misunderstood by courts and lawyers in the custody
arena. The theory is based on the hypothesis that children have a biologically
based need to form close affectionate bonds, and that those bonds will form
along a specific developmental course. 0 1 Children can be harmed both by the
failure to form appropriate attachments and by the loss of attached
relationships. A key aspect of attachment theory is that children learn to adapt
to the relationship environment in which they find themselves and organize
their behavior to the care-giving they receive. 10 2 The quality of relationships
children form have been described as secure (optimal), insecure (non-optimal)
and disorganized (showing some characteristics of both secure and insecure
attachments). ° 3 Research on attachment theory does not yield an ability to
predict the later development of children based on their early attachments, but
does establish a relationship between insecure attachment and a range of
characteristics harmful to children including lack of trust and the development
of controlling or survival strategies. 10 4 Just as the formation of insecure
attachments may be harmful to children, so also may be the loss of attached
relationships through separation. Parental separation, especially for very young
101Attachment theory was first articulated by John Bowlby. See generally JOHN
BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss: VOL II. SEPARATION: ANXIETY AND ANGER (1973);
JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss: VOL. III. Loss: SADNESS AND DEPRESSION

(1980); John Bowlby, Developmental Psychiatry Comes ofAge, 145 Am. J. Psychiatry
1, 1-10 (1988). Important elaborations of Bowlby's theory add significantly to the
body of basic information on attachment theory. See, e.g., MARY D. SALTER
AINSWORTH ET AL., PATTERNS OF ATTACHMENT: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE

STRANGE SITUATION (1978); Mary D. S. Ainsworth, Attachments Across the Life Span,
61 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. OF MED. 792, 792-812 (1985).

See Gillian Schofield & Mary Beek, Providing a Secure Base: Parenting
Children in Long-term Foster Family Care, ATTACHMENT & HUM. DEV., Mar. 2005, at
102

3, 3-25.

103 James G. Byrne et al., PractitionerReview: The Contribution of Attachment
Theory to Child Custody Assessments, 46 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 115

(2005) (describing attachment theory as it is relevant to child custody evaluations);
Nicola Morton & Kevin D. Brown, Theory and Observation of Attachment and Its
Relation to Child Maltreatment: A Review, 22 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1093 (1997)
(synthesizing attachment theory research as it relates to child maltreatment and
describing the development of the theory of disorganized attachment).
'4 See Byrne et al., supra note 103; Schofield & Beek, supra note 102.
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10 5
children who are not developmentally able to understand it, can be harmful.
Despite the large body of research on attachment theory, little of it has focused
on unproductive attachment formed by children. Without this research it is
difficult to justify continued contact between a child and an abusive parent
based on the child's attachment to the abusive parent.
Finally, the result of this analysis should not be to remove children from
their good parent/survivor of domestic violence in these cases.,0 6 Rather, it is
the continued exposure of children to an abusive or violent parent in a custody
case under circumstances in which the parent's contact with the child could be
curtailed that does not make sense. Supervised access, which is intended to
help ensure the safety of children, should not be the vehicle by which
unproductive and detrimental parental relationships are continued.

B. Rules & Statutes Governing Supervised Access

Setting aside these cases on the margin in which supervised access to
children should not be used to continue dangerous or threatening parental
relationships with children, courts and state legislatures should address some of
the gaps in current supervised access provisions to increase its utility and to
avoid the possibility that, over time, the absence of sufficient standards and
expectations for the use of supervised access will undermine its effectiveness
as a tool to protect children.
The states have taken different approaches in their provisions authorizing
supervised access to children. A number of states have adopted statutory
authorizations for supervised access. 10 7 In addition, courts have adopted rules

'0' Byrne et al., supra note 103.
106

All too often children have been removed from the parent who has survived

domestic violence. For an analysis of the relationship between child protection and
domestic violence, see Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child
Protection: UnderstandingJudicialResistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM U.
J. GENDER, SOC. POL'Y & L. 657 (2003); and Lois A. Weithom, Protecting Children
From Exposure to Domestic Violence: The Use and Abuse of Child Maltreatment, 53
HASTINGS L. J. 1 (2001).
107 See, e.g., ALA. CODE

§ 30-3-135 (2006); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (2006);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-403 (LexisNexis 2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-406 (West
2006); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13 § 710A (2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 753.001 (West
2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-7 (West 2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-46
(LexisNexis 2006); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/607.1 (West 2006); IND. CODE
ANN. § 31-17-2-8.3 (West 2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-701 (2006); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:341 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-101 (West 2006); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31A (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.175 (West 2006);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24 (West 2006); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.375 (West 2006);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-218 (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:5 (2006); N. M.
STAT. ANN. § 40-12-5.1 (West 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50B-2 (West 2006);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-22 (2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 112.2, 111.3 (West
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to govern awards of supervised access.' 0 8 Still other jurisdictions rely upon the
inherent power of the court to supervise custody and visitation as the basis for
supervised access to children. 10 9 These statutes, rules and judicial standards
vary substantially.
A few states expressly authorize courts to order supervised access to
children regardless of the specific factual context of the case. The standards in
these provisions vary. Some statutes impose few substantive limitations on the
imposition of supervised access to children. 110 Some require a showing that
supervised access is necessary to protect the child's physical or psychological
health."' Still other statutes authorize the imposition of supervised access only
in limited circumstances to, for example, avoid
parental abduction' 1 2 or
13
interference with the parent-child relationship."
By far the most common circumstance in which supervised access to
children is expressly authorized by statute and/or rule involves family violence.
A few of these provisions focus only on the conduct of the perpetrator of
violence-that is, the statute authorizes an order of supervised access if a
parent has engaged in certain acts of conduct irrespective of the relationship of
that conduct to the child or to visitation. 114 Most states condition the authority
to order supervised access on the court's finding that the parent's violent
conduct jeopardizes the health and safety of the child in some way. 115 A

2006); R.I.

GEN. LAWS §

15-5-16 (2006); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004 (Vernon

2006).

108See, e.g., IDAHO

R. Civ. P. 16(o) (describing duties and obligations for
providers of supervised visits).
109 See, e.g., Evans v. Terrell, 665 So. 2d 648, 652 (La. Ct. App. 1996) ("The trial
court has inherent power to determine a child's best interest and to tailor custody
orders, including visitation, in a manner that minimizes risk of harm to the child");
Willis v. Willis, 775 N.E. 2d 878, 886 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (pointing out that under
Ohio law, in modifying visitation to require supervised access, "the trail court is
granted discretion limited only by the child's best interest").
110
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §722.27a(8) ("A parenting time order may
contain any reasonable terms or conditions that facilitate the orderly and meaningful
exercise of parenting time by a parent, including 1 or more of the following:... f)
Requirements that parenting time occur in the presence of a third person or agency;
"' See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-410(B); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.175
(West 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-218 (2).
112 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-406 (a).
113See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/607.1 (c); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23701(g).
114 For example, the Alaska statute provides: "If the court finds that a parent has a

history of perpetuating domestic violence .... the court shall allow only supervised

visitation by that parent with the child .. " ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.1500).
115 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 13 § 710A ("If the Court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that a parent has sexually abused a child, the Court shall
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number of these states have incorporated a presumption against custody or
visitation by a parent who has engaged in family violence or child abuse.
Usually these presumptions can be rebutted by showing that visitation will not
jeopardize the child's health and safety and authorizing supervised visitation to
protect the child. 1 6 Texas and Indiana go so far as to impose a presumption
access in cases where the parent has engaged in domestic
against unsupervised
7
violence.

1

The family violence statues vary substantially regarding what type of
conduct constitutes family violence and, consequently, provide little guidance
to courts about when awards of supervised access to children are appropriate.
The narrowest statutes require that a parent subject to supervised access be
convicted of an offense that qualifies as family violence. 1 8 Other states do not
specifically define "family violence" or "domestic violence" for purposes of
their supervised access provisions.119 These types of vague provisions have
been criticized in the context of state statutes which establish a presumption
against granting custody to perpetrators of domestic violence.120 Without more

prohibit all visitation and contact between the abusive parent and the child until such
time as the Court finds, after a hearing, that supervised visitation would not harm,
endanger or impair the child's physical, psychological or emotional well-being");
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208 § 3 IA ("If ordering visitation to the abusive parent,
the court shall provide for the safety and well-being of the child and the safety of the
abused parent. The court may consider ...(b) ordering visitation supervised by an
appropriate third part.. ."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-22(3) ("If the court finds that a
person has perpetrated domestic violence and that parent does not have custody, and

there exists one incident of domestic violence which resulted in serious bodily injury
or involved the use of a dangerous weapon or there exists a pattern of domestic
violence within a reasonable time proximate to the proceeding, the court shall allow
only supervised visitation with that parent unless there is a showing by clear and

convincing evidence that unsupervised visitation would not endanger the child's
physical or emotional health").
116 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-46(9)-(1 1); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-524(9)(a)(i).
117 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-8.3(b); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
153.004(e). For a general discussion of the Texas statute, see Scott A. Young, A

Presumptionfor Supervised Visitation in Texas: Understanding and Strengthening
Family Code Section 153.004(E), 37 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 327 (2005).

1'8
For example, the Louisiana provision for supervised access to children defines
"family violence" by reference to the state Criminal Code.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN.

§

9:362(3).
119 See, e.g., ALA. CODE

§ 30-3-135;

ALASKA STAT.

§ 25.24.150; GA. CODE ANN.

§ 19-9-7.
120 See Judith G. Greenberg, Domestic Violence and the Danger of Joint Custody
Presumptions,25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 403, 419-21 (2005); Nancy K.D. Lemon, Statutes
Creating Rebuttable Presumptions Against Custody to Batterers: How Effective Are
They?, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 601, 603-10 (2001); see also Young, supra note
117, at 331-32 (describing the varying interpretations of Texas trial judges of the

JOURNAL OF LAW & FAMILY STUDIES

[Vol. 9

specific guidance, experience indicates that domestic violence often goes
unidentified and the protective provisions of these statutes are not triggered.'21
In the context of supervised access, where courts might find that their power to
restrict a parent's access to children is limited by such a statute, the failure to
trigger the statute in the widest possible appropriate circumstances, limits the
already narrow band of cases in which supervised access might be ordered.
In addition to the absence of substantive definitions in most supervised
access provisions, the provisions do not contain guidance on a number of
procedural issues that can arise in supervised access cases. 122 First, not all of
the provisions define supervised access. If a court order for supervised access
is not specific in these jurisdictions, it may not be clear whether the supervisor
must be present at all times during parent-child contact. Even "presence" can
be ambiguous-is a family member supervising access to a child "present" if
s/he is watching television while the supervised parent and child interact out of
sight or earshot? In one case in which an ambiguous supervised access order
was entered under Texas' presumption against unsupervised access to children
for a perpetrator of domestic violence, three children were murdered while
access was supervised. The supervisor designated by the court was the abuser's
mother, and the order did not require her to be constantly present when the
children were with the abuser. 123 Statutes and rules should establish default
provisions defining supervised access. Certainly in any given case, these
statutes should permit a court to fashion an order based on the specific facts of
a particular case that might define levels of supervision not contemplated in the
statute or rule; such deviations from the default, however, should be permitted
based on specific court findings. Furthermore, if "supervision" is not clearly
defined in a statute or rule, the order for supervised access should clarify the
court's expectation as to the level of supervision in each case.
Most of the statutory provisions do not contain guidance as to who should
supervise access to the child. Many jurisdictions have developed supervised
access programs that make trained supervisors available. These trained
supervisors vary widely in background and ability. Some are volunteers who

Texas statute imposing a presumption against unsupervised visitation when there is
credible evidence of a history of abuse).
121 See King v. King, 50 P.3d 453 (Idaho 2002). In King, the wife fled the
jurisdiction with the children after having previously obtained two domestic violence
protection orders. Id. at 456. The husband introduced evidence that his prior violent
outbreaks resulted from a psychiatric condition and his failure to take his medication.
Id. at 458-59. Attributing the conduct to the psychiatric condition, the Idaho court
found that the husband was not a "habitual perpetrator of domestic violence under the
Idaho custody statute." Id.
122 The Supervised Visitation Network, an organization of professional providers
of supervised access, has adopted guidelines and standards for supervised access
providers. Straus et al., supra note 28.
123 Young, supra note 117, at 330.
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have merely completed a minimal training session of four to ten hours. Others
have backgrounds in child development and demonstrated experience in the
field of family relations. 124 Many of the statutory provisions however, do not
even require the use of a minimally trained volunteer as a supervisor for
visitation and instead permit family members, friends and neighbors to
supervise access to children.' 25 Even in jurisdictions that have implemented
standards for child access supervisors, the rules may still permit the
appointment of untrained individuals. 26 The sticking point for requiring at
least superficially trained supervisors is cost; for many of the families in these
cases, the requirement to cover the costs of a trained supervisor would mean
that the parent being supervised would have no access to the children because
she or he could not afford to pay the supervisor.' 27 The safety benefit of
supervised access may be seriously undermined if the access supervisor is not
trained. He or she may be easily manipulated by an abuser or may not
understand the importance of vigilantly safeguarding the child.
None of the statutory provisions for supervised access establish a
mechanism for reviewing or re-evaluating an order of supervised access over
time. Certainly, review of the order can be obtained through the general
process of modifying custody and/or visitation, but the involvement of a third
party in a family on a continuing basis suggests that it might be useful to have
some more accessible method of evaluation.128 Regular review usually is not

Theonnes & Pearson, supra note 2, at 464-65.
For example, Montana's provision simply states that
"[i]f both parents or all contestants agree to the order or if the court finds that
in the absence of the order the child's physical health would be endangered or
the child's emotional development significantly impaired, the court may order
supervised visitation by the noncustodial parent. The court may not order the
department of public health and human services to supervise the visitation."
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-218(2).
126 The Idaho Rule governing supervised access is typical. While establishing
detailed requirements for therapeutic and professional supervisors, the rule does not
foreclose the use of untrained family members as supervisors. See IDAHO R. Civ. P.
16(o)(f) (requiring providers of supervised access to be trained, "unless otherwise
ordered by the court or stipulated to by the parties ... "); see also Straus et al., supra
note 28, at 97 (noting that "[t]he pressure resulting from a general absence of funding
for supervised visitation has also promoted diversity as programs struggle to function,
using volunteers, borrowing space, and making alliances with supportive entities
ranging from shelters for battered women to societies for the prevention of cruelty to
children and court-appointed special advocates.").
127 See Young, supra note 117, at 347-49 (discussing in detail the issues around
the cost of supervised access).
128 In many states the modification of a prior custody order is a cumbersome
124

125

process. See, e.g., Joel R. Brandes & Bari B. Brandes, The Ultimate Matrimonial
Motion PracticePrimer, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1577 (1998) (detailing the complex motion

practice process for family law matters in New York).
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even provided for in those instances where supervised access is anticipated
from the beginning to be temporary. Without provisions for accessible review,
supervised access orders can extend long past their useful life-interfering
with the relationship between a child and a parent who no longer requires
supervision." 9 More importantly, supervised access may continue even in the
face of negative impacts on the child because the barriers to modification are
simply too high.
IV.

CONCLUSION

While supervised access is an important tool for protecting children, its
use must be scrutinized and effective guidelines for its implementation should
be established. Supervised access should not be used as a mechanism by which
courts fail to address fundamental questions regarding whether the
continuation of parent-child contact is in a child's best interests. In addition,
clear guidelines must be formulated for the implementation of supervised
access in order to assure that the safety of children will be protected.
Supervised access provisions should clearly define the substantive standards
for the use of supervised access. The provisions should define what is meant
by supervised access, and who can be considered an appropriate supervisor.
The provisions should also establish a mechanism for regular review of
supervised access orders to ensure that the child's safety is being protected and
that the supervised access is not perpetuating an unproductive parent-child
relationship. Finally, further social science research relevant to supervised
access should be undertaken. A better understanding of when parent/child
relationships should be preserved by supervised access is necessary. Research
on children's experience of supervised access is also necessary.

See, e.g., Little v. Smith, 2006 WL 3114376 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006)
(recognizing that supervised visits continued long after mother had successfully
completed treatment and therapy for psychiatric disorder that may have previously
endangered child); Brown v. Brown, 925 So. 2d 662 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that
the trial court abused its discretion when it attempted to provide for interim review of
the custody order despite the fact that the mother had successfully completed substance
abuse treatment and had been drug free for three years).
129

